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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

"In the absence of evidence the commissioner’s deficiency determination
is approved.” An examination of the reported decisions of the United States
board of tax appeals reveals the startling fact that considerable numbers of
tax cases are decided in accordance with the reason stated in the foregoing
quoted phrase. That this condition should obtain must cause the taxpayer
to give some thought as to the selection of his representatives to present his
cases before this board. He sees, in many instances, the findings of a revenue
agent prevail when his evidence is ruled out because of the intricacies of the
rules of evidence. He wonders why it is that the findings of a revenue agent
have more weight than those of his representatives, when the former seems
to decide every moot question in favor of the government, ignores competent
evidence adduced to him and computes the tax with the idea that if he is in
error, it devolves upon the taxpayer to convince someone higher in authority
of the fact. He also wonders why it is that when he tries to show the board
the error made, he finds that because of some abstruse rule of evidence his
proofs are not admissible. He wonders why a conclusion of a revenue agent
has so much more weight as evidence than has his. He is told often enough
that his evidence is not evidence but conclusions.
In this month’s issue of The Journal of Accountancy there is printed an
address delivered by Hon. J. G. Korner, Jr., chairman of the United States
board of tax appeals, at the regional meeting of the American Institute of Ac
countants held at Cincinnati, May 23rd of this year. His address is most
interesting and its careful reading is urged.
Among other instructive items found therein is that in which he quotes
Honorable Owen D. Young as having come to the conclusion that "facts” are
about the scarcest commodity in the universe and that he had come to this
conclusion because of the paucity with which they are used.
There is a time honored story to the effect that two lawyers were riding
through the countryside when one lawyer remarked to the other that a sheep
that was grazing in an adjacent meadow had been sheared. The other lawyer
glancing at the sheep said, "Yes,—at least this side of it has been sheared.”
It is also a time honored theory that lawyers make poor witnesses because of
their knowledge of the limitations imposed by the rules of evidence.
As has been pointed out in these columns, it behooves accountants admitted
to practice before the United States board of tax appeals to equip themselves
with a working knowledge of how to get the facts before that body.
Certified public accountants, it is urged, are dealing with facts as revealed by
written records of such facts; they are also credited with expert knowledge of
the recognized method of recording such facts. To a great degree the several
revenue acts have recognized accounting records as being the basis for deter
mining the prescribed taxable income.
Of course, we believe that certified public accountants admitted to practice
before the board are best fitted to supply it with the disinterested view of
accountancy facts. This, theoretically and almost always, is the task the
certified public accountant sets for himself and performs, but, apparently,
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when he appears for the taxpayer he is regarded as an advocate and as such, of
course, it is presumed that he interests himself only in the presentation of such
facts as favor his client. Therein is the wide divergence between the account
ant and the lawyer, and if the board will recognize this, it would appear that
its view of its rules of practice would be the subject of thoughtful consideration
and possible modification.
If the accountant is expected to come frankly before the board in the rôle
of an advocate and not as an impartial expert, some modification of the at
titude of the accountant towards cases of this kind would appear to be
necessary, and this would be distinctly unfortunate. The remedy may be
for the accountant to recognize more clearly the distinction between the
submission of evidence and the advocacy of deductions drawn from that
evidence.
SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Claims for wages against the estate of a bankrupt are subordinate to claims
for taxes. (U. S. supreme court decision in case of West Coast Rubber Cor
poration, et al. v. U. S. et al.)
Amounts of net profits credited to individual surplus accounts standing in
the names of the stockholders, which were not and could not have been at
that time, actually distributed to the stockholders were held not to be bor
rowed capital of the corporation and were allowed to be included in invested
capital. (U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, Eaton, Collector, v.
English & Merrick Co.)
A conveyance of real estate by a woman sixty-four years of age to her
daughter a few months before her death was held not to have been made in
contemplation of death upon the evidence presented, and, hence, not subject to
estate tax (Meyer v. U. S. in U. S. Court of Claims).
A corporation is not entitled to increase its invested capital upon sale of the
entire capital stock by its sole stockholders to another at a price much greater
than the cost of corporation’s assets. (Union Petroleum Steamship Company
v. Edwards in U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.)
Amount received under a will from the income of an estate is taxable income
to the beneficiary, though it is held that the beneficiary had no interest in the
principal of the estate. (U. S. Supreme Court decision, Irwin, Collector v. Gavit.)
Acceptance by the government of an offer of compromise of a tax consti
tutes such a demand as to make the tax a lien on the taxpayer’s property, and
the offer of compromise constitutes a waiver of such demand as would be other
wise necessary. (Guaranty Trust Co. v. McKenrick et al.—U. S. Court of Claims).
Unsecured creditors who pay a tax which has become a lien on the property
of the debtor are subrogated to the rights of the government as preferred
creditors when the debtor is adjudged bankrupt. (Guaranty Trust Co. v.
McKenrick, et al., U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.)
Railroads operated under the federal control act were entitled to have paid
by the government two per cent of their income taxes on the amount of gov
ernment compensation, although such compensation was paid after the
termination of federal control. (P. & W. Va. Ry. Co. v. U. S. in U. S. Court
of Claims.)
Where policies of life insurance were taken out prior to the passage of the
estate tax law, the proceeds of such policies payable to designated benefici
aries are not to be included in gross estate under act of 1918 (U. S. Supreme
Court decision in Llewellyn v. Frick, et al.).
In determining gain or loss of owner or lessee upon the sale of oil rights
under the act of 1917, depletion sustained or previously allowed for oil ex
tracted may not be subtracted from the cost price. Depreciation sustained
or previously allowed should not be deducted from cost price in determining
gain or loss on sale under the act of 1917. (Ludey v. U. S. Court of Claims 0f
the U. S.)
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Congress may, under the sixteenth amendment, tax gross income without
allowing deductions for any cause. Depreciation on a contract due to lapse
of time rather than wear and tear may be deducted under the act of 1918 but
not under the act of 1916. The March 1, 1913 value of a contract was com
puted by multiplying the difference between the market value of the product
and contract price at that date by the estimated volume of business during
the remaining life of the contract, and by capitalizing the sum so obtained.
(Kentucky Tobacco Products Co. v. Lucas, Collector, U. S. District Court, W. D.,
Kentucky.)
A deduction of that portion of salary which was intended to cover traveling
expenses is allowable only upon proof of such portion being actually expended.
(B. T. A. decision 365, docket 1209.)
Evidence of the value fixed on property in a local assessment, standing
alone, does not prove the value of such property. (B. T. A. decision 368,
docket 563.)
A manufacturer of malt was not allowed to take a deduction for obsolescence
upon the passage of prohibition legislation in the absence of evidence as to
when obsolescence would likely occur. (B. T. A. 375, docket 375.)
The cost of advertising for which no deduction is taken in the year such
expense is incurred may not subsequently be included in invested capital nor
charged off against income. (B. T. A.381, docket 1185.)
Dividends declared and paid in first 60 days of 1918 out of 1917 earnings
are taxable to the recipients at 1918 rates. (B. T. A. decision 382, docket 1554.)
The cost of equipment, installed to produce war materials and continued
in use with undiminished value as equipment after such contracts are com
pleted, is not deductible as a business expense nor under the amortization
provisions. (B. T. A. decision 390, docket 672.)
A bankrupt business has no good will of value to be included in invested
capital. (B. T. A. decision 393, docket 136.)
The taxpayer is not required to confine his appeal to the adjustments made
by the commissioner in the taxpayer’s return. (B. T. A. decision 396, docket
1495.)

TREASURY RULING

(T. D. 3693—April 23, 1925)
Gross Income—Revenue Act 1921 and prior—Decision of Court

Corporation Income Taxes—Revenue Act

1. Appeal

and

Review—Finding

by

of

Referee

1918—Decision

in

of

Court

Bankruptcy.

Unless the finding of a referee in a bankruptcy proceeding on disputed
evidence is clearly against the weight of the evidence or based on a mistaken
view of the law, it will not be disturbed by an appellate court, especially if the
finding has been approved by the court on petition for review.
2. Corporations—Affiliation—Consolidated Returns.
Where one corporation owns all of the voting stock of another corporation,
or such stock as carries control by one corporation over another, such corpora
tions are affiliated within the provisions of section 240 of the revenue act of
1918, and a consolidated return of income should be filed.

3. Decision Affirmed.

The decision of the district court of the United States for the eastern district
of Missouri (299 Fed. Rep., 326) affirmed.
The appended decision of the United States circuit court of appeals for the
eighth circuit in the case of John F. Schlafly, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the
Temtor Corn & Fruit Products Co., v. The United States is published for the
information of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.

47

The Journal of Accountancy
United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

No. 6661.—

December Term, A. D. 1924
John F. Schlafly, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Temtor Corn & Fruit Products
Co., appellant, v. United States of America, appellee
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Missouri
[February 17, 1925.]
This is an appeal from an order of the district court approving an order of
the referee in bankruptcy allowing a claim of the United States against the
estate of the bankrupt, Temtor Corn & Fruit Products Co., hereafter referred
to as the Temtor company, for $36,395.23 as the balance due for income and
excess profit taxes from the Temtor company for the year 1920. The referee
allowed the claim, filing an elaborate opinion, reviewing the evidence, stating
his findings and the conclusions of law. On a petition for review the allowance
of the claim was by the district court approved. (299 Fed., 326.)
Exhibits I and 2 to Mr. Hall’s testimony (who was the attorney for the
vendor in the transaction) are the agreements for the sale, purchase, and lease
of the plant, between the Corn Products Refining Co., hereafter referred to as
the Products company, and the Best-Clymer Co., hereafter referred to as the
Clymer company.
The agreement between the parties provided for the sale and purchase of
the Granite City plant, the property of the Products company, to the Clymer
company for the price and sum of $4,500,000, to be paid $50,000 in cash and
the balance in cash upon the delivery of deed on January 2, 1920, provided
that the buyer is to let and rent it to the seller until October 1, 1920, at an
aggregate rental of $1,245,000, payable in monthly installments. The seller
also agreed to pay as additional rent for said premises all taxes and water
rents that may be levied and become a lien on said property on or before
October 1, 1920, to keep the property insured in an amount not less than
$2,750,000, the loss to be payable to the buyer. That there should be no
abatement of rent in case of fire or accidental destruction of the plant or any
part thereof. That upon the expiration of the term, when possession is de
livered to the buyer, the premises shall be in as good condition and state of
preservation as at the present time, usual wear and tear excepted. The buyer
also obligates itself to purchase from the seller all merchandise manufactured
and in process, supplies and stores, on hand October 1, 1920, at the fair market
value, to be paid in cash. The sale is not to include trade-marks, trade rights,
or good will of the seller.
The agreement was subject to approval by the United States district court
for the southern district of New York, the court in which the decree in the
proceedings by the United States against the Products company under the anti
trust statutes of the United States had been rendered. That decree provided
that the Products company is required to sell the Granite City plant, subject to
the approval of the court, with a proviso that only persons or corporations
intending to continue the business shall be eligible as purchasers. Exhibit 12
is a contract between the promoters of the organization of the Temtor company
and the bankers, in order to secure the funds necessary to enable it to purchase
from the Products company its manufacturing plant, located at Granite City,
state of Illinois. That contract provided for the incorporation of a new com
pany, to acquire the Granite City plant from the Products company, and also
the common stock of the Clymer company. There were to be two classes of
stock, A and B. Class A shares to be entitled to a priority of dividends up to
$4 a share per year (equivalent to 8 per cent a year, the shares were to be no
par, and to be sold to the public at $50 a share) and the dividends to be cumu
lative. In case of liquidation, class A shares to have priority up to $50 a share.
The stockholders of the Clymer company were to receive 27,750 shares of class
B stock in exchange for their common stock of the Clymer company, subject to
certain conditions; 137,500 shares class A stock and 20,000 shares of class B
stock of the new corporation to be issued to the bankers, who were to pay into
the treasury of the new corporation $5,500,000, provided the Granite City plant
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of the Products company is acquired for $4,500,000. It further provided that
from the rental to be paid by the Products company to the new corporation the
first $765,000 shall be deposited in a trust company to be held for the payment
of the dividends of $4 per share on both classes of stock of the new company
during the first year, i. e., from October 1, 1919, to October 1, 1920.
On October 3,1919, the Temtor company was incorporated under the laws of
the state of Illinois.
At a meeting of the board of directors of the Clymer company on September
19, 1919, the agreement with the Products company for the purchase and lease
of the Granite City plant and with the bankers for securing the funds neces
sary to make the purchase were ratified and approved, and later by the stock
holders.
After the incorporation of the Temtor company, on October 3, 1919, under
the laws of the state of Illinois, at a meeting of its board of directors, an offer
for the sale of the shares, in conformity with the agreement with the bankers,
was accepted and later consummated. This offer was made by Mr. Frank P.
Page, acting evidently for the bankers. The offer was that he would subscribe
for 137,640 shares of class A stock, and 55,500 shares of class B stock, upon
the following conditions:
He would sell' and transfer to the Temtor company 18,500 shares of the
common stock of the Clymer company, and pay $5,449,000 in cash, $4,500,000
of that sum to pay for the Granite City plant, agreed to be purchased from the
Products company; that the Temtor company will immediately, upon acquiring
the plant, lease it to the Products company, on the terms set forth in the
agreements between that company and the Clymer company, and accept an
assignment of these agreements from the Clymer company. He also stated
that a syndicate had been formed to purchase 113,000 shares of class A stock to
be issued by the Temtor company at $44 a share; that he will distribute 27,500
shares of the class B stock among the stockholders of the Clymer company, the
distribution to be made in the ratio of one share of the Clymer stock for one
and a half shares of the Temtor stock, as had been agreed on by its stock
holders, the remainder of class B stock to be divided among his associates and
the management of the Temtor company.
At a meeting of the board of directors of the Temtor company on November
11, 1919, a resolution was adopted to set aside as a trust fund out of the rents
received from the Products company for the Granite City plant sufficient
money to assure the payment of $4 per share per annum on all the issued and
outstanding shares of this company, and a dividend was declared of $4 a share,
payable out of the fund set aside, payable quarterly, beginning on January 5,
1920. Seven hundred and sixty-five thousand dollars was accordingly set
aside from the rentals received and applied to the payment of dividends.
The articles of incorporation of the Clymer company provided that the
preferred stock shall have no voting rights whatsoever, nor shall the holders
thereof be entitled to receive notice of stockholders’ meetings, except if the
cumulative dividends on the preferred stock shall remain unpaid for two
consecutive years, the preferred stock shall then be entitled to vote on all
questions until the defaulted cumulative dividends on the preferred stock
shall have been paid.
The authorized capital stock of the Clymer company was 10,000 shares of
preferred stock of the par value of $100 each and 20,000 shares of common
stock without nominal or par value.
The claim of the United States in controversy is for an assessment for
income and excess profit taxes amounting to $114,668.30 of the Temtor and
Clymer companies, and interest on the deferred installments amounting to
$143.34, or a total of $114,811.64. Three of the installments had been paid,
leaving a balance of $22,571.18 due and interest thereon amounting to $1,410.70.
An additional income and excess profit tax was assessed by the commissioner
of internal revenue in December, 1922, amounting to $12,713.35, and the entire
claim due December 31, 1922, is for $36,695.23.
In the assessment $1,000,000 received by the Temtor company from the
Products company as rent for the plant in that year was included, and if
properly included, the claim was properly allowed, provided it was lawfully
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made, which is attacked by appellant upon grounds hereafter stated. If
this rent is to be excluded, as contended by counsel for appellant, the claim
was improperly allowed.
In the motion of appellant to disallow the claim, so far as it is necessary
to state them, the grounds are:
That there were no income or excess profits during that year.
That the $1,000,000 included in the return of the Clymer company as alleged
rental collected from the Products company was a mere sham; that the real
purchase price for the Granite City plant was $3,500,000, and that the
$4,500,000 inserted as the purchase price in the deed of conveyance was to
make a market in behalf of the promoters for the sale at a profit of the stock
of the Temtor company, to be formed and which the promoters had under
written, and that in fact no part of the $1,000,000 was a rental for the plant
sold.
Another ground relied on in behalf of appellant is that the return on which
the assessment was made was a joint return for the Temtor and Clymer com
panies, and unauthorized. The Temtor company owned all the common stock
of the Clymer company, which alone had voting power. Its preferred stock
was held by a number of persons, who owned it for investments, but this stock
had no voting power so long as there was no default in the payment of
the prescribed dividends, and there was no default during the period in
controversy.
Before Kenyon, circuit judge, and Trieber and Phillips, district judges.
Trieber, district judge, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opin
ion of the court.
In the argument of counsel for the appellant the principal ground relied on
for a reversal is that the finding by the referee, approved by the learned dis
trict judge, is not warranted by the evidence; that the evidence requires a
finding that the lease of the Granite City plant was simulated and the rental
paid thereunder a return of the purchase price.
At the outset we are confronted with the well-settled rule that, in a pro
ceeding in equity—and this must be treated as such—the findings of the chan
cellor on disputed evidence have not the conclusive effect as the findings of a
jury or of the trial judge when a jury has been waived in an action at law,
but, unless it is clearly against the weight of the evidence or based on a mis
taken view of the law, it will not be disturbed by an appellate court, espe
cially if the finding has been made by a master or, in a bankruptcy proceeding,
by the referee, and approved by the court on a petition for review. (Ohio
Valley Bank Co. v. Mack, 163 Fed., 155, 158, 89 C. C. A., 605; Baker v. BishopBabcock-Becker Co., 220 Fed., 657, 136 C. C. A., 265.)
In Ohio Valley Bank Co. v. Mack, Circuit Judge Lurton, later a justice of
the supreme court, speaking for the court, said: “If the finding is based upon
conflicting evidence involving questions of credibility and the referee has
heard the witnesses, much greater weight naturally attaches to his conclu
sion, and the weight of authority is that the district judge, while scrutinizing
with care his conclusions upon a review, should not disturb his finding unless
there is most cogent evidence of a mistake and miscarriage of justice. . . .
The conclusion he reached in favor of the validity of his debt has also passed
the scrutiny of the district judge. Under such circumstances this court is not
warranted in overturning the conclusion of two courts upon anything less than
a demonstration of plain mistake.”
But it is claimed that this rule does not apply to the instant case, as the
hearing before the referee was on depositions entirely, and he had no better
opportunity to determine the credibility of the witnesses than this court has.
Prior to the promulgation of the present equity rules the evidence in equity
cases was entirely on depositions, yet the same rule of law was followed by
the supreme court and all other national appellate courts.
In Newell v. Norton (70 U. S., 257, 267), which was an admiralty case,
in which the entire evidence -was on depositions, it was held:
"It is enough to say that we find ample testimony to support the decision,
if believed; and that we again repeat, what we have often before decided,

50

Income-tax Department
that in such case, parties should not appeal to this court with any expecta
tion that we will reverse the decision of the courts below because counsel
can find in the mass of conflicting testimony enough to support the allega
tions of the appellants. . . . Parties ought not to expect this court to revise
their decrees merely on a doubt raised in our minds as to the correctness of
their judgment, on the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of conflicting
testimony.”
And this court had uniformly so held. (Dickey v. Dickey, 94 Fed., 231,
36 C. C. A., 211; Harrison v. Fite, 148 Fed., 781, 78 C. C. A., 447; Mastin v.
Noble, 157 Fed., 257 [506], 85 C. C. A., 506 [98]; United States v. Marshall,
210 Fed., 595, 127 C. C. A., 231; United States v. Grass Creek Oil & Gas Co.,
236 Fed., 481, 149 C. C. A., 533; De Laval Separator Co. v. Iowa Dairy
Separator Co., 194 Fed., 423, 114 C. C. A., 365, and authorities there cited.)
The error must be palpable to justify it. (Babcock v. De Mott, 160 Fed.,
882, 86 C. C. A., 64.)
This applies with greater force if two courts have reached the same con
clusion. (The Caleb [Carib] Prince, 170 U. S., 655; Page v. Rogers, 211
U. S., 575; Princeton First National Bank v. Littlefield, 226 U. S., 110; United
States v. State Inv. Co., 264 U. S., 206, 211.) A careful review of the evi
dence fails to show that the transaction between the Products and the Clymer
and Temtor companies was not what it purports to be, a sale of the Granite
City plant for $4,500,000 and the lease of the plant to the Products company
until October 1,1920, at an aggregate rental of $1,245,000, payable in monthly
installments.
The undisputed testimony establishes that under the decree of the district
court for the southern district of New York, in an antitrust suit instituted
by the United States against the Products company, it was required to sell this
plant. In all the negotiations between the parties the Products company re
fused to take less than $4,500,000 for the plant, and a lease until October 1st
of the succeeding year, or for one year. All offers of a less sum were refused
by it, and several were made. It insisted on the lease in order to enable it
to manufacture the products made in that plant, to fill contracts of sale for
the product then in force, and made that a condition of the sale. Before the
sale could be completed it was necessary to obtain the approval thereof by the
district court for the southern district of New York, as was provided in the
decree of that court in the antitrust suit. The petition to that court, presented
for its approval, stated the provisions of the agreement for the sale, and that
the purchaser would continue the business, and was accompanied by an
affidavit of Mr. Bedford, its president, that the price to be received for the
plant was a fair one, taking into consideration the lease of the plant, although
to reproduce it at that time it would cost more; that neither the Clymer nor
the new corporation to be formed was in any way controlled by or affiliated
with the Products company or any of its affiliated corporations; that no stock
holder of the Products company has any substantial interest in the stock or
securities of either of said corporations, nor any of its officers or directors
any interest in common with them. The petition was by the court approved
and on January 2, 1920, the deed and lease for the plant were executed and
delivered, reciting the consideration to be $4,500,000, and revenue stamps
required for that sum affixed thereto.
Mr. Bedford testified that he considered that the plant should earn $2,500,000
annually, and therefore refused the offer of the purchasers to divide the
profits of the plant with them. He considered the annual rental of $1,240,000
to be reasonable, including the other terms of the lease, namely, that the
Products company was to pay as additional rent all taxes and water rents, to
keep the property insured in an amount not less than $2,750,000 for the benefit
of the lessors, and that there should be no abatement of rent in case of fire
or accidental destruction of the plant.
He further testified that, shortly before the expiration of the lease, he
offered to renew the lease for six months on the same terms, which was
refused, Mr. Clymer, representing the Temtor company, telling him he would
not renew the lease for $1,000,000 a month. This is undisputed.
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Mr. Fisher, the secretary and treasurer of the Products company, testified
that the amounts paid for rent of the plant were entered on the books of
the corporation as expenses and $4,500,000 as the sum received for the plant,
and the profit and loss account charged with a profit of $2,079,049.31, the
excess of its value, as it appeared on its books and the $4,500,000 received
for the plant from the Temtor company.
The contention, and we may say the sole contention, on behalf of appellant,
and based solely on inferences, is that the entire transaction was merely a
subterfuge, to enable the bankers, who had underwritten the sale of the class
A stock of the Temtor company, to declare 8 per cent dividends, and thereby
impress on the public the great value of this stock; that in order to enable
them to do so, the lease was resorted to and thereby added to the real con
sideration to be paid for the plant the sum called rental. We may assume
this to be true, so far as the promoters, the new company, and the brokers
were concerned, still the appellant’s contention is without merit, as there
is no evidence whatever that the Products company was a party to it.
Even if the agreement had provided for the sum, less the rentals, but that
as a further consideration for the purchase of the plant the vendor should
retain possession thereof for a year, without payment of a rental, except the
assumption of the provisions relating to the payment of taxes and insurance
by the vendor, the real rental value of the plant would be a part of the con
sideration of the sale, and a very valuable part thereof.
There is nothing unusual, in a sale of real estate, for the vendor to provide,
with the consent of the vendee, for retention of possession of the premises
for a certain time and paying rent therefor on terms agreed on by the parties.
The vendor may desire to retain possession of the premises until he can find
another location, either for his business or, if the premises are occupied as
a home, of another home. The premises may be under an unexpired lease
entered into years ago, when rents were much lower than at the time of the
sale, and, therefore, he is unable to deliver possession, and the vendee demands
the present rental value. May not the vendor and vendee agree on the rental
to be paid by the vendor for that unexpired term on a basis of present rental
value?
That the vendee would be entitled to a rental for the year its vendor had the
use of the plant is beyond question; and if the vendor was willing to pay the
sum specified in the agreement, and assume the other obligations of the agree
ment, the vendee or his representative, the trustee in bankruptcy, has no right
to complain.
What evidence is there to justify a finding that the Products company made
this agreement for the purpose of enabling the promoters to perpetrate a fraud
on anyone? There can be but one answer: None.
The resolution of the Temtor company, setting aside a part of the rental for
the purpose of paying dividends on its share of stock, had no connection with
the transaction between the Products and Clymer companies. There is not
a shadow of evidence that it had knowledge of how the promoters or bankers
would raise the purchase money for the plant. The final agreement for the
sale and lease between the parties had been made on September 16, 1919, to
become effective upon its approval by the district court of New York. This
was obtained by the order of that court on October 25, 1919. The resolution
for the setting aside of a sufficient part of the rentals for the purpose of
paying the dividends on its shares was adopted by the board of directors of the
Temtor company at its meeting on November 11, 1919, when the only obliga
tions assumed by the Products company were to execute its deed of conveyance
of the plant on January 2, 1920, and carry out its obligations of the terms of
the lease.
All parties to the contract considered the lease as favorable. The representa
tives of the Clymer company and of the new company to be formed preferred
an equal division of the profits of the plant as rental, which the Products com
pany declined, as being less favorable to it. The Products company was willing
to renew the lease on the same terms, for a period of six months after October
1, 1920, but the Temtor company declined to grant it, considering it worth
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more. That thereafter the Temtor company sustained losses in the operation
of the plant could not affect the validity of the transaction. It is a wellknown fact that many businesses, although making large profits during the
years 1919 and 1920, were less successful in the succeeding years; in fact,
sustained losses, owing to the changed conditions prevailing in the country.
The losses may have been due to lack of proper management. But whatever
may have been the cause, it can not affect the good faith of the Products
company. The burden of proof was on the appellant, who pleaded the fraud.
(Jones v. Simpson, 116 U. S., 609, 615; Walker v. Collins, 59 Fed., 70,
8 C. C. A., 1; Crawford v. Boussard, 160 [260] Fed., 122, 171 C. C. A., 158;
In re Hawks, 204 Fed., 309, 316, affirmed 213 Fed., 177, 125 C. C. A., 521.)
None was offered, and counsel for appellant rely entirely on presumptions
arising from the terms of the lease.
As the money was collected as rentals, the company was liable to pay the
income and excess profits taxes under the then existing laws of the United
States.
This conclusion leaves only for consideration whether the internal revenue
commissioner had the right under the law to require a consolidated report of
the Clymer and Temtor companies, in view of the fact that the Temtor com
pany owned all of the voting stock of the Clymer company, although consider
able of its class A stock, which had no voting right at that time, was owned by
others.
The pertinent provision of the income tax law of 1918, section 240 (a)
(40 St., 1081), reads:
“(a) That corporations which are affiliated within the meaning of this
section shall, under regulations to be prescribed by the commissioner with
the approval of the secretary, make a consolidated return of net income and
invested capital for the purposes of this title and title III, and the taxes
thereunder shall be computed and determined upon the basis of such return.
“In any case in which a tax is assessed upon the basis of a consolidated re
turn, the total tax shall be computed in the first instance as a unit and shall then
be assessed upon the respective affiliated corporations in such proportions as
may be agreed upon among them, or, in the absence of any such agreement,
then on the basis of the net income properly assignable to each.

“ (b) For the purpose of this section two or more domestic corporations shall
be deemed to be affiliated (1) if one corporation owns directly or controls
through closely affiliated interests or by a nominee or nominees, substantially
all of the stock of the other or others, or (2) if substantially all the stock of
two or more corporations is owned or controlled by the same interests.”
We fully agree with the views expressed by the court below:
“Here in this case all of the voting stock was held by the bankrupt, though
there were some 3,000 other stockholders holding preferred stock, which had
no vote until dividends were passed for a stated period. I readily appreciate
that the control of one corporation over another is ordinarily had by reason
of control of the voting stock therein, and not through control of the nonvoting
stock. It is also true that no one is to be taxed unless there exists a statute
which authorizes the imposition of the tax. Such a statute is, however, to
be given a reasonable construction, when it in fact exists, with a view to car
rying out its purpose and intent. Here the purpose of congress was to fore
stall such manipulation of profits of one corporation, through control by reason
of voting stock, as would prevent the government from ascertaining correctly,
and from collecting the sums justly due it, from excess profit taxes, of the
controlled and affiliated corporations.
“I reach, then, but by another method, the conclusion reached by the
referee—that is, that congress had in mind, voting, stock only, or such stock
as carried control by one corporation over its affiliated corporation. Unless
this was the purpose or meaning of congress, the statute is practically worth
less and wholly incapable of enforcement.’’
The judgment of the court below was right and is affirmed.
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